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Order and Disorder in Everyday Action: 
The Roles of Contention Scheduling and Supervisory Attention 
Richard P. Cooper 
R.Cooper@bbk.ac.uk 
School of Psychology 
Birkbeck, University of London 
Malet Street, London WC1E 7HX 
Abstract: This paper describes the contention scheduling/supervisory attentional system approach 
to action selection and uses this account to structure a survey of current theories of the control of 
action. The focus is on how such theories account for the types of errors produced by some 
patients with frontal and/or left temporo-parietal damage when attempting everyday tasks. Four 
issues, concerning both the theories and their accounts of everyday action breakdown, emerge: 
first, whether multiple control systems, each capable of controlling action in different situations, 
exist; second, whether different forms of damage at the neural level result in conceptually distinct 
disorders; third, whether semantic/conceptual knowledge of objects and actions can be dissociated 
from control mechanisms, and if so what computational principles govern sequential control; and 
fourth, whether disorders of everyday action should be attributed to loss of semantic/conceptual 
knowledge, a malfunction of control, or some combination of the two. 
Introduction 
The cognitive requirements of the control of action appear to vary substantially between tasks. At one extreme, 
action control may appear to require little cognitive effort, as when driving a familiar car along a familiar route. 
At the other extreme, action control may demand constant attention to the task, as when a novice programmer is 
debugging a computer program or when a novice cook is attempting to prepare a roast meal for the first time. 
Norman & Shallice (1980, 1986) employed the phenomenological difference between these extremes to argue 
for the existence of two distinct systems for the control of thought and action. They argued that in routine 
situations behaviour is controlled by a relatively automatic system, which they referred to as contention 
scheduling (CS), but that a second system, referred to as the supervisory attentional system (SAS), could be 
invoked in situations requiring attention to detail (e.g., situations involving trouble-shooting, novelty, planning, 
decision making or the suppression of an habitual response). Shallice (1988) added a further source of evidence 
for a dual-systems approach: Engineering experience derived from Artificial Intelligence work on planning and 
problem solving suggests that a single control system for preparing and performing a plan is insufficient. More 
adequate systems employ separate sub-systems, operating in different ways, for the routine execution of plans 
and for the development of new plans. With the addition of one assumption — that there is a repository of basic 
or standard plans — the distinction between planning and performing a plan maps directly onto that between 
SAS and CS. 
In fact, the control of action, even in the service of everyday tasks that are highly routinised, demands 
considerable computational sophistication (cf. Cooper & Shallice, 2000). This complexity stems in part from the 
requirement to co-ordinate or integrate perceptual information (for the location and identity of objects on which 
to act) and effector state information (for the selection of effectors with which to act) with goals, intentions, and 
plans, and to maintain goal-directed behaviour throughout a task. 
To illustrate, consider the relatively simple “everyday” task of applying jam to toast. This may involve grasping 
a butter knife (with an appropriate grip), dipping it in the jam (and ensuring that a reasonable quantity of jam is 
captured on knife’s blade), and applying the jam to the toast with several spreading actions. If the jam jar is 
closed prior to attempting the task, it is necessary to open it. This is best done prior to picking up the knife, as it 
is likely to require both hands. Furthermore, if several implements are available (as is often the case), most 
should be ignored in favour of a butter knife. If no butter knife is available, it may be necessary to suspend the 
routine while fetching an appropriate knife from a kitchen draw. Thus, even this simple task requires the 
detection and selection of appropriate objects, the suspension and subsequent resumption of activities (while 
fetching a suitable knife), the maintenance of goal/sub-goal relations while completing the task, the monitoring 
of task goals (to ensure that an appropriate amount of jam is applied, and to terminate spreading when the toast is 
covered with a sufficiently even coat of jam) and even simple planning (in determining that the jam jar should be 
opened before grasping the knife, or, if dealing with multiple slices of toast and limited jam, ensuring that each 
slice gets a share of the jam). 
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Given the complexity of the control of everyday activities, it is not surprising that the system or systems 
responsible are prone to error. Both Reason (1979, 1984, 1990) and Norman (1981) have catalogued slips and 
lapses in the everyday action of neurologically intact individuals and developed classification systems for the 
errors observed. Common error types include capture errors (when action is “captured” by a familiar but 
unintended routine), substitution errors (when one object or location is used in place of that which should be 
used), omission errors (where some crucial action or step is left out), perseverative errors (where an apparently 
correct action is unnecessarily repeated) and sequence errors (where correct actions are performed in an incorrect 
order, through, for example, anticipatory performance of a task-appropriate action).  
It is also not surprising that everyday action control may be affected by neurological disorders. Of particular 
interest in this context are disorders such as ideational apraxia (IA: De Renzi et al., 1968; De Renzi & Lucchelli, 
1988), frontal apraxia (FA: Luria, 1966) and action disorganisation syndrome (ADS: Schwartz et al., 1991, 1995, 
1998, 1999), as well as disorders of action occurring with various forms of dementia (e.g., semantic dementia 
(Hodges et al., 2000), and dementia with various aetiologies (Giovannetti et al., submitted)). These disorders are 
not necessarily distinct. Thus, frontal apraxia and action disorganisation syndrome are generally accepted as 
referring to a single disorder but emphasising different aspects of that disorder (lesion site versus behavioural 
disturbances), and Buxbaum et al. (1998) and Giovannetti et al. (submitted) argue that all four disorders 
generally lead to similar patterns of breakdown in action. Regardless of the distinctness or otherwise of each of 
the disorders, they are of special interest because many of the errors of everyday action produced by such 
neurological patients can be understood as exaggerated forms of the more occasional errors produced by normal 
subjects. Thus, Schwartz et al. (1991) reported a patient with anterior corpus callosum and bilateral frontal lobe 
damage (HH) who frequently produced errors such as adding butter to coffee (when preparing instant coffee), 
and perseveratively turning the tap on and off while attempting to brush his teeth. Both of these errors may be 
understood as extreme forms of the kind of action slips that occur occasionally in the behaviour of normals 
(especially when they are distracted: Reason, 1984). 
The errors of both normals and neurologically impaired individuals offer the prospect of insights into the 
systems and processes involved in the control of everyday action, and both have informed the development of 
the CS/SAS theory. However, several alternative accounts of the control of action exist, and it has been argued 
that the CS/SAS theory does not sit well with some impairments of everyday action control (Schwartz et al., 
1991). This paper surveys current theories of the control of action and considers how various forms of 
breakdown in action control following neural damage may be accounted for within those theories. The paper 
begins with a more detailed description of the CS/SAS theory before considering empirical studies of the 
breakdown of action control (in both naturalistic and controlled settings) and the application of the CS/SAS 
theory to such breakdown. Alternative accounts, of both action control and its breakdown, are then surveyed. 
The paper ends by drawing out from the theoretical and empirical work major themes in the control of everyday 
action. 
Contention Scheduling and the Supervisory Attentional System 
Within the dual-systems theory of Norman & Shallice (1980, 1986), the system responsible for control in routine 
situations, CS, is held to consist of a hierarchically structured network of action schemas. Schemas represent the 
abstract structure of well-learned action sequences, independent of any specific objects to which those action 
sequences might be applied (e.g., Schmidt, 1975). Thus, one might possess schemas for brushing one’s teeth or 
preparing tea. Hierarchical structuring is held to arise because schemas may comprise further, component, 
schemas. Thus, a tea preparation schema might contain component schemas for boiling water or adding milk to a 
beverage. In addition, component schemas may be shared by several higher-level schemas. Thus, coffee 
preparation and tea preparation might share sub-schemas for boiling water and adding sweetener. 
Schemas are assumed to have associated triggering conditions, activation values and selection thresholds. A 
schema’s triggering conditions specify the conditions under which the schema should be initiated. The activation 
value is a continuously varying quantity that can be affected by factors such as: mutual inhibition between 
schemas with overlapping resource requirements; triggering from the environment (which is dependent upon the 
extent to which the schema’s triggering conditions are matched by the environment); triggering from higher-
level schemas; motivation; and direct excitation or inhibition from the SAS (the system responsible for action 
control in non-routine situations). 
Behaviour is controlled by those schemas within CS that are most active. Specifically, if the various factors 
affecting a schema’s activation cause that activation to exceed the schema’s selection threshold, then the schema 
is selected and begins to actively excite its component schemas. This excitation, under normal functioning, leads 
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to one or more component schemas also becoming active and hence selected. Selection of a schema at the lowest 
level triggers the corresponding low-level behaviour (e.g., grasping in an appropriate manner). Once selected, a 
schema continues to operate until either its goal is satisfied or its component schemas are complete, whereupon it 
is inhibited, allowing other schemas to become active. 
The assumptions concerning activation flow are essential to the maintenance of order within the CS system. For 
example, the assumption of mutual inhibition between schemas with overlapping resource requirements is 
critical in preventing multiple schemas with conflicting resource requirements from becoming active 
simultaneously. Similarly, the assumption of environmental triggering of schemas is critical in ensuring the 
correct timing of component schemas. Such schemas are effectively primed through excitation from a higher-
level selected schema. Environmental triggering then discriminates between the components. This, and inhibition 
of completed schemas, bias the CS system towards performing the components schemas of a selected high-level 
schema in the correct sequence.  
Several aspects of the internal structure and functioning of CS are motivated by behavioural disturbances 
resulting from neurological disorders. Thus, utilisation behaviour (Lhermitte, 1983; Shallice et al., 1989), which 
involves an apparent inability by afflicted patients to avoid using objects in their immediate environment in an 
appropriate fashion, even when specifically instructed not to do so, suggests that action schemas may be 
triggered by the presence of appropriate objects in the immediate environment, but that under normal functioning 
such triggering is insufficient to result in object use (possibly because of inhibition from competing schemas, or 
because of inhibition from the SAS). Further evidence for an activation-based CS system may be adduced from 
amphetamine psychosis (in which subject’s repetitive and stereotyped behaviour is suggestive of a hyperactive 
CS system: cf. Robbins & Sahakian, 1983) and Parkinson’s disease (which includes among its symptoms an 
inability to initiate action, possibly resulting from an under-active CS system: cf. Frith, 1992). Norman & 
Shallice (1986) also suggest that the processes of competition within CS can account for both perseverative 
behaviours and distractibility of patients with frontal lesions, on the assumption that such patients’ behaviour 
results from a normally functioning CS system in the absence of appropriate SAS control. 
The primary foci of Norman & Shallice (1980, 1986) were CS and the distinction between CS and SAS. SAS 
itself was characterised only in abstract terms as a separate system that operated indirectly by modulating 
activation within CS. SAS was held to be invoked either when CS did not contain a schema for the desired 
behaviour or when it was necessary to avoid a strong habitual response. In such situations the effect of SAS was 
to excite or inhibit schemas within CS in sequence in order to obtain a desired behaviour. More recently, Shallice 
& Burgess (1996) have considered the internal structure and operation of SAS, and suggested that its interaction 
with CS is effected through the construction (by SAS) of temporary schemas. Such schemas, it is argued, control 
behaviour through standard CS mechanisms (i.e., by modulating activation flow to component schemas within 
the CS system). 
The neural localisation of CS and SAS remains unclear. Norman & Shallice (1986) suggested that the functions 
of CS might be performed by the basal ganglia. More recent work (Rumiati et al., in press), however, suggests 
that the motor cortex is a more likely site. Supervisory functions are generally considered to be performed by 
frontal structures (Shallice, 1982, 1988). Further localisation is likely to result from current attempts at 
fractionation of the SAS (cf. Shallice & Burgess, 1996; Burgess et al., 2000). Frith (2000) suggests that the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex plays a critical role in the modulation of CS by SAS. 
The CS/SAS account is rooted in earlier work by both Norman and Shallice. Shallice (1972) proposed an early 
information processing model of thought and action. The model was motivated by the need to provide an 
information processing correlate for the phenomenological concept of consciousness, and incorporated a set of 
competing goal-directed “action systems”. Action systems were argued to have continuously variable activation 
values, to receive activation from perceptual or motivation systems, and to be mutually inhibitory. Norman 
(1981) was concerned to account for action slips and lapses in normals. He developed an activation-trigger-
schema (ATS) framework, in which action was controlled by schemas that have activation values, and which 
could be triggered by aspects of the immediate environment. Norman used the ATS framework to provide an 
analysis of a range of slips and lapses. Capture errors, for example, such as counting “…, 8, 9, 10, Jack, Queen, 
King” when counting pages produced by a copying machine, may be explained in terms of unintentional 
activation, either due to recent related thoughts or activities (e.g., playing cards) or to environmental triggering. 
The parallels between the systems of Shallice (1972) and Norman (1981) and the CS system are clear. 
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Disorders of Action Control and Their Relation to Contention Scheduling 
The original development of Norman & Shallice’s dual-systems account of action control was not directly 
informed by action control disorders of the apraxic type. Nevertheless several such disorders are of direct 
relevance to the structure and functioning of CS and its relation with SAS. Thus, Ideational Apraxia (IA: De 
Renzi et al., 1968; Poeck & Lehmkuhl 1980; De Renzi & Lucchelli, 1988) is characterised by impaired 
performance on simple tasks involving the production of a sequence of actions, typically using multiple objects. 
Such simple tasks, including for example pouring from a bottle into a glass and drinking from the glass, are 
presumably the province of CS. IA would therefore appear to be a consequence of breakdown of either CS 
processes, access to/storage of the information used by CS, or both. IA is generally associated with damage to 
the left temporo-parietal junction (De Renzi & Lucchelli, 1988), but similar behavioural signs may be shown by 
patients with extensive frontal lesions (i.e., frontal apraxics). Thus, Luria (1966) noted that some frontal patients 
were prone to error on simple tasks such as lighting a candle. His patients tended to perseverate (e.g., continuing 
to strike the match against the match-box after the match was lit) and misuse everyday objects through the 
merging of fragments of related behaviour (e.g., lighting a candle and then attempting to smoke it as if it were a 
cigarette). 
Notwithstanding the behavioural similarities between IA and FA on simple tasks involving multiple actions, the 
apparent difference in localisation, together with the now standard views of the role of the frontal lobes in 
executive tasks (Shallice, 1982, 1988) and the role of temporo-parietal structures in action control (Jeannerod, 
1997), points to a different relationship between FA and the CS/SAS complex. Specifically, FA would seem 
more appropriately explained as a consequence of a failure by SAS to properly regulate CS (due either to 
improper functioning within SAS or to improper behaviour of SAS at the SAS/CS interface). This explanation 
requires that some form of SAS input is necessary for normal performance on tasks as simple as lighting a 
candle, and brings FA under the umbrella of other frontal disturbances discussed by Norman & Shallice (1986). 
It is also essentially the position advocated by Luria (1966), who considered the frontal lobes to be critical to the 
programming, regulation, and verification of behaviour (see also Shallice, 1988), and who attributed FA to “the 
gross disintegration of the “preliminary synthesis” of intended actions and […] disturbances of the process of 
comparison of intention and effect” (Luria, 1966, p. 238). 
That supervisory input may be necessary for normal performance on everyday tasks is to some extent a departure 
from early versions of the SAS/CS theory. However, recent data from eye-movement studies of normals 
completing the everyday task of tea-making (Land et al., 1999) suggests that some supervisory-type processes 
are employed in the service of everyday action. In particular, Land et al. (1999) have found evidence for several 
different types of monitoring (locating, directing, guiding and checking) that normals engage in at key points 
during tea-making. Such monitoring may reflect supervisory processes that, if necessary, modulate activation 
flow within CS. If so, the data of Land et al. imply that some supervisory processes play important roles in the 
performance of everyday action. 
The distinction between IA and FA is not undisputed. Action disorganisation on everyday tasks following frontal 
injury has been investigated extensively by Schwartz and colleagues, using both single case study methodology 
(Schwartz et al., 1991, 1995) and group study methodology (Schwartz et al., 1998). These studies, together with 
detailed comparisons between the patterns of errors produced by frontal and left-temporal patient groups on 
complex multiple object tasks (Buxbaum et al., 1998) suggest that IA and FA (referred to by Schwartz and 
colleagues as Action Disorganisation Syndrome) are equivalent disorders. This is not to say that IA and FA 
patients are indistinguishable in their behaviours. Rather, the assertion is that they share a specific action control 
deficit. In the case of frontal patients, this deficit may present in conjunction with other executive functions 
and/or gross behavioural disturbances. 
Some light may be shed on the possible relations between IA, FA and CS by considering in detail the behaviour 
of IA and FA patients on a variety of tasks (including several that have been used to determine the presence of 
IA), and by reconsidering the relation between CS and these tasks. Tasks that are intended to be diagnostic of IA 
are normally designed with a view to allow discrimination between IA and ideomotor apraxia (IMA). IMA 
affects lower-level motor control, and is apparent in tasks such as imitating gestures (e.g., saluting) and 
pantomiming. Thus, De Renzi & Lucchelli (1988) compared the performance of 20 right-handed patients with 
left brain damage on a multiple objects test (which included tasks with a sequential component such as lighting a 
candle and preparing a letter for posting) with their performance on three further tests: tests of object use 
pantomime (which required patients to pantomime the use of a range of objects, such as a hammer or a tooth-
brush, which were presented visually to the patient); a test of actual object use (using the same objects from the 
pantomime test); and a test of gesture imitation. The patients all showed signs of IMA, but there was no 
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correlation between their scores on the gesture imitation test and the multiple object test, suggesting that IMA 
and IA are distinct disorders. 
Patient errors on the multiple objects test were categorised by De Renzi & Lucchelli into six types. The most 
frequent error type was the omission of a necessary step (e.g., attempting to fix a stamp to an envelope without 
first moistening the stamp). Only one patient in the group of 20, patient 12 who was least severe on most 
measures, made no omission errors. The number of omission errors did not, however, correlate significantly with 
total errors (r = 0. 357; p < 0.123). In contrast, object misuse (e.g., making a stirring motion with a bottle opener 
inside a glass) and action mislocation (e.g. sticking the stamp on the back of the envelope), which were also 
common, did correlate with total errors (object misuse: r = 0.929; p < 0.001; action mislocation: r = 0.760; p < 
0.001). Other errors included moderate rates of general perplexity and clumsiness and low rates of anticipatory 
sequence errors. 
Schwartz and colleagues (Schwartz et al., 1991, 1995, 1998) and Humphreys & Forde (1998; see also Forde & 
Humphreys, 2000) have performed similar studies of the use of multiple objects by frontal patients, including 
naturalistic/observational studies of everyday tasks such as preparing coffee, and more controlled experimental 
tasks involving an additional level of complexity (e.g., preparing and packing a lunch box, both in the absence 
and presence of distractor objects). Similar results were obtained, with the most frequent error type being that of 
omission of a step. Additionally, both Schwartz et al. (1998) and Humphreys & Forde (1998) found that the 
presence of distractor objects did not lead to inappropriate use of those objects. Schwartz et al. (1998) did, 
however, report an increase in omission errors when distractor objects were present. 
On the basis of this evidence, it would appear that the patients studied by Schwartz and colleagues and by 
Humphreys & Forde represent an apraxic syndrome closely related to, if not indistinguishable from, that studied 
by De Renzi & Lucchelli (1988). In this respect it is curious to note that, although all patients in the De Renzi & 
Lucchelli study had left brain damage, that damage was not exclusively temporo-parietal, and five patients were 
described as having lesions restricted to left frontal regions. No differences were observed by De Renzi & 
Lucchelli between frontal and temporo-parietal patients on any of the tests. In a similar vein, Buxbaum et al. 
(1998) have reported data from group studies of frontal and left temporal patients performing complex everyday 
activities. No significant differences were found in the error profiles (or the sensitivity to the presence of 
distractor objects) between the two groups. Both of these studies thus further support the view that IA and FA 
are intimately related. 
An alternative position that might be adopted is that multiple object tests are too coarse to discriminate between 
IA and FA. This position suggests that, while multiple object tests may discriminate between IMA and higher-
level apraxias, further testing is required to discriminate between IA and FA. We therefore turn to a second task 
— picture sequencing — that has been claimed to be diagnostic of IA (Lehmkuhl & Poeck, 1981). The picture 
sequencing task requires subjects to order a set of photographs depicting stages in a simple sequential multiple 
objects task (e.g., looking up a phone number and making a phone call). Lehmkuhl & Poeck (1981) administered 
a set of picture sequencing tasks to several patient groups (5 IA patients, 30 non-IA patients with left brain 
injuries, 10 non-IA patients with right brain injuries and 15 control subjects). All five IA patients performed 
more poorly (producing more incorrectly sequenced photograph sets) than subjects from any of the other groups. 
Moreover, the IA patients were no different from the other groups on ordering pictures of everyday activities 
with a sequential component that did not involve multiple objects (e.g., shopping). On the basis of this study, 
Lehmkuhl & Poeck (1981) suggested that a deficit in the sequencing of pictures depicting simple multiple object 
tasks was indicative of IA. 
The sequencing abilities of patients with action selection disorders potentially attributable to frontal damage 
have been explored by Humphreys & Forde (1998). In one experiment (experiment four), four patients (two with 
predominantly frontal damage and action selection disorders as revealed by behaviour on simple multiple object 
tests and everyday tasks and two neurologically-impaired control subjects without an action organisation deficit) 
were given a set of cards with verbal descriptions of steps from an everyday task (e.g., preparing toast). The 
descriptions had been elicited from the subjects in a previous experiment. The subjects were required to place the 
cards in the correct temporal sequence. All subjects made order errors, but the action-impaired subjects made 
many more errors than the neurological control subjects. These results are consistent with those from similar 
studies by Sirigu et al. (1995, 1996) on the sequencing of action descriptions by frontal patients. While Sirigu 
and colleagues did not examine performance of everyday activities in their patient groups, they did find that 
frontal patients were more susceptible than posterior patients or control subjects to sequence errors (and closure 
errors, whereby a sequence would be prematurely terminated) when ordering verbal descriptions of task steps. 
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In a further task, Humphreys & Forde (1998) asked the same subjects to sequence series of letters and numbers. 
The action-impaired subjects were particularly poor at sequencing letters, though one patient also showed 
difficulties with numbers. In contrast, the neurological control subjects made few errors in ordering either type of 
stimulus. Humphreys and Forde suggest that the sequencing deficits of frontal apraxics are most pronounced in 
tasks that draw upon long-term knowledge which is not intrinsic to the stimuli being sequenced. 
Notwithstanding the difference in modality of presentation, the results of Lehmkuhl & Poeck (1981) and 
Humphreys & Forde (1998) suggest that both frontal and ideational apraxics have difficulties in sequencing the 
components of everyday tasks. Frontal apraxics appear in addition to show more profound sequencing 
difficulties (extending to seriation tasks involving numbers and/or letters). The situation is not clear cut, 
however. Rumiati et al. (in press) report two IA patients (with no frontal involvement) who were unable to 
perform simple sequential multiple object tasks, but who had little difficulty in sequencing corresponding 
photographs. Rumiati et al. contrast their IA patients with a frontal control patient who was able to perform the 
sequential multiple object tasks with few errors and could correctly sequence both numbers and shapes of 
different sizes, but who had difficulties in sequencing task-related photographs. Thus, contrary to Lehmkuhl & 
Poeck (1981), a deficit in the sequencing of photographs depicting multiple object tasks is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for IA. 
The information processing requirements of picture sequencing and the performance of multiple object tasks are 
very different. They clearly have common elements (e.g., the knowledge of the components and order of the 
underlying script for the task) and distinct elements (e.g., those relating specifically to performing an action). 
The inability of (some) IA patients to perform picture sequencing has been argued to imply that such patients are 
unable to access that knowledge (Lehmkuhl & Poeck, 1981), but Sirigu et al. (1995) offer the same explanation 
for the inability of frontal patients to order verbal descriptions of steps within a task, and Humphreys & Forde 
(1988) offer a related explanation for the sequencing deficits of their (predominantly) frontal patients. However, 
none of these explanations can extend to Rumiati et al.’s frontal patient, who appears to have had intact task 
knowledge, despite being unable to apply that knowledge in picture sequencing. 
The empirical picture is therefore unclear. On the one hand, a variety of patient groups perform in a qualitatively 
and quantitatively similar manner on everyday tasks involving the sequential use of multiple objects. In many 
cases similar results are obtained on picture/description sequencing tasks, with no clear distinction between IA 
and FA patients. However, some dissociations between patients on sequencing tasks have been reported: IA, at 
least, can occur in the absence of a sequencing deficit. At present the same cannot be said for FA. 
How might the similarities between IA and FA (assuming that they are distinct) be accounted for within the 
Norman & Shallice (1980, 1986) dual-systems approach? It was suggested above that within such an approach 
IA might be characterised as a deficit within CS, while FA might be characterised as a deficit related to SAS and 
its control over CS. Schwartz et al. (1991) pointed out that such an account failed to explain why disorganisation 
of routine behaviour (i.e., action that could, in principle, be controlled by CS alone) could occur following 
damage confined to frontal regions. If the control of routine action does not require supervisory attention, then 
damage to supervisory processes should not impact upon that behaviour. 
One counter to this argument concerns the definition of routine behaviour. The patient reported by Schwartz et 
al. (1991) was observed over a three month period in a neuropsychological recovery ward. Two “routine” 
behaviours were examined: preparing instant coffee (in the context of eating an institutional breakfast) and 
brushing teeth. In both cases, these tasks were being performed in a non-routine environment. Indeed, arguably 
HH’s recovery over the three month period reported by Schwartz at al. reflects the progressive routinisation of 
his behaviours within the neuropsychological ward. Such routinisation would, according to the dual-systems 
theory, reduce the supervisory load imposed by the tasks. Similar comments apply to patient JK (Schwartz et al. 
1995). 
More recent work by Schwartz and colleagues (Schwartz et al., 1998, 1999; Buxbaum et al., 1997, 1998) has 
investigated the behaviour of various patient groups on the Multi-Level Action Task (MLAT). This task requires 
subjects to perform a variety of everyday subtasks within a controlled experimental environment. While it may 
be argued that many of the components of the subtasks are likely to be routine to some subjects (e.g., buttering 
bread), the higher level task in which those component tasks are embedded (e.g., packing a lunchbox), and the 
controlled experimental context in which the MLAT is performed, ensure that the MLAT taps a level of action 
beyond that which is routine. 
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The argument in defence of the CS/SAS account of FA is therefore that everyday action (as performed within the 
MLAT) must be distinguished from routine action. Everyday action requires supervisory control (a point made 
by Schwartz et al., 1991), and hence will be impacted by deficits in that control. In contrast, routine action, by 
definition, does not require supervisory control, and hence need not be impacted by deficits affecting that 
control. In order to make this argument more strongly, it is necessary to provide concrete instances of routine 
tasks or actions, and to specify precisely how supervisory processes may be invoked in everyday activities. In 
addition, in order to relate the argument back to the claim that IA and FA are distinct disorders affecting distinct 
functional components of the action selection system it is necessary to demonstrate that FA does not impact 
performance of truly routine activities, and that different functional disorders (one relating purely to CS and the 
other affecting the modulation of CS by SAS) can yield equivalent behaviours on more complex tasks such as 
the MLAT. 
A Computational Implementation of Contention Scheduling 
The above issues have begun to be addressed through the computational implementation of the CS theory 
(Cooper & Shallice, 2000; see also Cooper et al., 1995, Cooper et al., submitted). Although the implementation 
extends the CS theory in several ways, it demonstrates that: 1) a system based on CS is capable of controlling 
routine action; 2) with minor extensions it is capable of controlling everyday action; and 3) breakdown of the 
system can lead to behaviour on everyday activities similar to that seen in both FA and IA. It remains to be 
demonstrated that an additional system is required for the control of non-routine action, or that in such an 
extended model multiple forms of damage may lead to similar breakdown of action on everyday sequential 
multiple object tasks. 
The Model 
The Cooper & Shallice (2000) implementation of the CS theory follows the Norman & Shallice (1986) 
description in most respects: at the centre of the model (see figure 1) is a hierarchically structured network of 
schemas that compete for activation within an interactive activation framework. Schemas receive excitation and 
inhibition from various sources, including higher level schemas, the representation of the environment and 
competing schemas. The principal theoretical developments embodied in the model concern the representation of 
the environment and the inclusion of mechanisms to regulate serial order. The model has been applied to a range 
of tasks, including coffee preparation (Cooper et al., 1995; Cooper & Shallice, 2000), choice reaction time 
(Cooper, 1998) and packing a lunch box (Cooper et al., submitted). 
 
Figure 1: The principal functional components of the Contention Scheduling implementation. 
The representation of the environment is modelled as a second interactive activation network, in which nodes 
correspond to object representations. Object representations have separate activations for different functions. 
Thus, a representation of, for example, a sugar bowl might be highly active as a source but inactive as a target. In 
such a situation an action like dip spoon, which requires a source into which the spoon should be dipped, will be 
likely to use the sugar bowl, and an action like empty spoon, which requires a target into which the spoon should 
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be emptied, will be likely to use some other target. Nodes in a third interactive activation network represent 
cognitive and effective resources (e.g., a language processing subsystem, the hands) that might be required when 
performing a schema. 
The object and resource representation networks interact with the schema network via feedback loops, such that 
object and resource representation nodes excite, and are excited by, schema nodes, provided that the 
corresponding objects/resources are appropriate for the corresponding schemas. This mechanism ensures that, 
when a schema becomes active, it will tend to excite appropriate object and resource representations on which to 
operate, and when an object or resource representation becomes active, it will tend to excite schemas that use it. 
A selection process monitors the schema network and selects a schema when its activation exceeds its selection 
threshold. In order for the model to select schemas in an appropriate order, it is necessary that schemas be 
activated or triggered in sequence. Some low-level actions may be sequenced largely on the basis of 
environmental triggering. Higher order schemas (e.g., relating to making instant coffee, where most people add 
coffee grinds before milk/cream), however, require an additional mechanism to control sequence. This is 
achieved within the model by gating activation from a selected schema to its component schemas, such that only 
those component schemas that are appropriate at a given point in time, are activated when their parent schema is 
selected. In the coffee making case, excitation from the “coffee-making” schema would not pass to the “add 
milk” schema until the “add coffee grinds” schema was complete. This was originally achieved in a version of 
the model applied to the task of coffee preparation (Cooper & Shallice, 2000) through the specification of ad hoc 
ordering constraints within higher-level schemas, but a subsequent implementation applied to the more complex 
everyday task of preparing and packing a lunch box (Cooper et al., submitted) introduced pre-conditions and 
post-conditions on the components of all schemas. A portion of the schema hierarchy for this more complex task, 
with pre-conditions and post-conditions specified, is shown in figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: A portion of the Contention Scheduling schema network, with informal 
pre-conditions and post-conditions specified. Subschemas and their pre-conditions 
are not shown for Unseal Bread-bag, Remove slices and Seal Bread-bag. 
Pre-conditions and post-conditions play an essential role in the model’s application to complex tasks. Consider 
the case of making a sandwich (a component of the lunch box packing task). The task requires that two slices of 
bread are first removed from a bread-bag. This in turn requires that the bread-bag is opened, the slices removed 
and then the bread-bag resealed. A pre-condition of removing the slices is that the bread-bag is open. That the 
bread-bag is open is also a post-condition of the opening step. If the bread-bag was left open, then, because the 
post-condition of opening is satisfied, the opening step will not receive excitation from its parent schema, even 
when that schema is selected. However, the remove slices schema will receive excitation from its parent schema 
at this stage, because its pre-condition (that the bread-bag is open) is satisfied (see figure 2). In this way, the use 
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of pre-conditions and post-conditions allows for behavioural flexibility by providing a mechanism for 
component schemas to be optional. This flexibility can, in principle, apply at any level in the schema hierarchy. 
Behaviour of the Model 
When given an appropriate set of schemas, the model is, with suitable tuning of the strength of activation flow 
between the various networks, able to generate extended sequences of task-appropriate, goal-directed actions. In 
the case of packing a lunch box, up to 52 actions may be involved. Each action must be selected at an 
appropriate point in the task, and in association with appropriate object and effector representations. Noise 
within the interactive activation networks leads to variability in the order of subtasks, but, at low levels, does not 
normally lead to erroneous action selections. 
The model may be lesioned either by increasing the level of noise or by altering the strength of any of the 
activation sources. Cooper & Shallice (2000) found, with respect to the coffee preparation task, that a decrease in 
top-down excitation within the schema network, coupled with an increase in environmental triggering from the 
object representation network, led the model to produce all of the types of errors common in frontal apraxia (e.g., 
sequence errors, omission errors, object substitution errors, etc.). They also found that lesioning through 
modification of other parameters (specifically self activation and lateral inhibition) produced behaviour 
reminiscent of amphetamine psychosis and Parkinsonism. 
As noted above, application of the model to the more complex task of preparing and packing a lunch box 
required the addition of more systematic mechanisms to control sequential order. On this task, the model was 
generally more susceptible to omission errors but less susceptible to all other error types. The mix of error types 
produced by frontal apraxics was only observed at high levels of noise, where the model produced the full range 
of error types, with a bias towards omission errors, and was appropriately sensitive to the presence of distractor 
objects (producing significantly more omission errors, and more object substitution errors, in the presence of 
distractors than in their absence). In particular, decreasing top-down excitation within the schema network led to 
an increase in omission errors, but not to an accompanying increase in errors of commission (Cooper et al., 
submitted). 
The two simulations present a mixed picture. While the model is able to simulate both normal and disorganised 
behaviour on multiple tasks, different manipulations appear to be required to generate disorganised behaviour on 
different tasks. This may in part be attributed to task differences. For example, in a case study of one frontal 
apraxic, Schwartz et al. (1991) report different error profiles for different tasks, with the errors produced by the 
patient being dependent on the error possibilities provided by the task.  
The Nature of Pre-Conditions and Post-Conditions 
There are at least two ways in which the pre-conditions and post-conditions introduced for control of complex 
everyday activities may be interpreted. First, their goal-oriented nature may be taken to imply that they belong to 
the realm of supervisory processes. On this interpretation, the model is not simply a model of CS, but a model of 
CS with rudimentary supervisory processes. The gating of top-down excitation based on pre-conditions and post-
conditions may then be re-interpreted as the net result of top-down excitation applied by a CS system to all 
component schemas combined with inhibition from SAS of schemas with unsatisfied pre-conditions or with 
satisfied post-conditions. This re-interpretation fits well with the view that frontal lobes frequently serve 
inhibitory functions, but suggests a different approach to the simulation of frontal damage. On this view, such 
damage should comprise increasing excitation of component schemas whose pre-conditions are not satisfied or 
whose post-conditions are satisfied. 
A second interpretation of pre-conditions and post-conditions stems from the observation that, computationally, 
they are no more complex than triggering conditions: they are evaluations based on states of the environment. 
The difference is that pre-conditions and post-conditions are dependent upon the higher-order context in which a 
schema is triggered. From this perspective, pre-conditions and post-conditions are effectively task-specific 
triggering (and inhibiting) functions, and their inclusion within a low-level, unsupervised, system for routine 
action control may be justified. 
Issues Remaining to be Addressed by the Model 
Evaluation of the CS model as described is hindered by two factors: the need to explicitly specify schema 
structure (including pre-conditions, triggering conditions and post-conditions) on a task-by-task basis, and the 
absence from the model of supervisory functions such as monitoring and error recovery. Cooper & Glasspool 
(2001) have begun to address the first of these difficulties by demonstrating that schema triggering conditions 
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can be acquired through reinforcement learning. However, it is the second factor that is most problematic. If CS 
is a system for the control of routine behaviour, then any model of CS can only be evaluated on routine 
behaviour, and if the action of CS may be modulated by supervisory functions such as error recovery after 
detection of an error (Shallice & Burgess, 1996), then both monitoring and error recovery must be modelled in 
order to properly simulate errorful behaviour over an extended period (as in the behaviour of frontal apraxics on 
the lunch box packing task). It is likely that the elaboration of the model to include supervisory processes of 
monitoring and error recovery will present difficulties for the model’s evaluation. In this regard, eye movement 
data, such as that of Land et al., (1999), but extended to include different neurological groups, will prove 
invaluable. 
Alternative Accounts of Action Control and its Breakdown 
The distinction between routine and non-routine action, and the subsequent introduction of separate action 
control systems, distinguishes the CS/SAS account of action control from most other accounts. Schwartz et al. 
(1991, 1998) suggest, however, that the distinction is not necessary in accounting for breakdown of action 
control in everyday activities. This section therefore surveys a number of alternative accounts of action control, 
with special attention to their relation to the CS/SAS theory and to the ways in which IA/FA errors may arise 
within the various accounts. 
Roy & Square (1985) 
Roy & Square (1985) propose a three level “conceptual-production system” model of limb control and consider 
how a number of apraxic errors may arise within the model. The highest level of the model is purely conceptual, 
and concerned with three types of abstract action-related knowledge: knowledge of objects in terms of actions 
and functions, knowledge of actions independent of objects, and serial order knowledge. The two lower levels 
are based on condition-action rules (productions), and concerned with knowledge of action in sensorimotor form 
and the mechanisms of movement control respectively. It is assumed that environmental cues may led to actions 
being triggered and selected, and that activation may spread between associated action control units. 
Furthermore, while higher levels are assumed to require greater attentional resources, simultaneous execution of 
multiple action programs is still assumed to be possible. 
The details of action flow and its role and relation to the production system elements of the model are not spelt 
out. Nevertheless, Roy & Square provide a qualitative account of many apraxic errors. Thus, some object misuse 
errors are attributed to breakdown of conceptual knowledge, while spatial errors (e.g., attempting to write with 
the wrong end of a pencil) are attributed to incomplete spatial knowledge at the intermediate production system 
level. 
Notwithstanding the under-specification of certain aspects of Roy & Square’s account, there are important 
similarities and differences between it and the CS/SAS model. Similarities include the distinction between a high 
level system requiring attentional resources and lower-level systems, the activation-based nature of action 
control units with triggering from the environment and the possibility for multiple active action programs. 
Differences include the use by Roy & Square of a production system at lower levels and of spreading activation 
between related actions, and the use within the CS/SAS model of a distinct network of object representations. 
The differences between the systems lead to differences in accounts of certain apraxic-type errors, but there are 
still multiple ways in which a single behavioural error might be accounted for within the Roy & Square model. 
Thus, an object misuse error may result from faulty conceptual knowledge, or from faulty operation within the 
production system, or by spreading activation from one action to a related action. If one adopts the most obvious 
(and admittedly crude) characterisation of IA and FA in the model — that IA is primarily due to faulty 
conceptual knowledge and FA is primarily due to faulty spreading of activation — then, like the CS/SAS model, 
the Roy & Square model predicts that both apraxias may result in similar behavioural disturbances on everyday 
tasks. 
MacKay (1985) 
Roy & Square (1985) do not consider the details of how actions within a sequence are timed. This is the primary 
focus of the theory advanced by MacKay (1985), who also proposes an activation-based system of action 
control. MacKay posits three types of nodes: content nodes, sequence nodes, and timing nodes. Content nodes 
are arranged hierarchically, with nodes at the lowest level corresponding to muscle movements. Content nodes 
may receive activation from higher level content nodes, a pragmatic system (roughly equivalent to the SAS), the 
environmental context and/or from sequence nodes. Sequence nodes in turn receive activation from timing 
nodes, which determine the rate of behaviour. 
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There are clear similarities between MacKay’s approach and the dual systems approach of Norman & Shallice. 
The principal difference concerns the inclusion of sequence and timing nodes. Sequence nodes represent the 
serial order of actions within a sequence through inhibitory links from nodes at the start of the sequence to nodes 
later in the sequence (cf. Estes, 1972). Thus, the sequential relationship between A, B, and C is encoded via 
inhibitory links from the node corresponding to A to those corresponding to B and C, and from the node 
corresponding to B to that corresponding to C (see figure 3). When all nodes within a sequence are activated by a 
timing node, that with the least number of inhibitory links will reach threshold first (i.e., A in this example, 
which has no inhibitory links). This node will then excite appropriate action nodes and, when the actions are 
completed, be inhibited, allowing the next sequence node (B, in this example) to reach threshold. 
 
Figure 3: MacKay’s (1985) inhibitory approach to sequencing. 
Connections marked  are inhibitory. 
MacKay (1985) suggests two ways in which IA/FA-type behaviour might arise within the system: as a 
disconnection syndrome affecting higher levels of the action system and other cognitive systems, or as a 
dysfunction of the sequencing nodes. The parallels between MacKay’s theory and the CS/SAS approach mean 
that the former is equivalent to a disconnection between CS and SAS. A similar account of FA may therefore be 
given. IA cannot be accounted for purely via the latter, however. While a dysfunction of sequence nodes would 
account for sequence errors (including omissions, which may also be attributed to decay of activation, and 
perseveratons), it would not account for object substitution errors. MacKay suggests that such errors require 
impaired top-down excitation of action nodes, which, it is argued, leads to a greater dependence on 
environmental triggering (much as in the CS/SAS theory). 
Duncan (1986) 
One fact that is perhaps under-emphasised in the above discussions of frontal apraxia is the generalised nature of 
action disorganisation that may follow frontal lobe damage. Duncan (1986) argues that this generalised 
disorganisation is best conceived of as a failure of goal-based cognition, resulting either from failure to 
adequately compare existing states of the world with goal states, or failure to retrieve or construct actions or 
action sequences that are adequate for achieving one’s current goals. This view is consistent with the view that 
one of the functions of SAS is to formulate and regulate (goal-directed) plans (Shallice, 1982). Duncan’s 
contribution, which is concerned purely with FA, is to clarify the nature of specific subprocesses required for 
goal-directed behaviour. The account does not, however, address all aspects of FA. In particular it is lacking in 
detail with regard to the origins of specific error types, and some types of error (e.g., object substitution errors) 
would appear to be entirely beyond the scope of the theory. 
Grafman (1989, 1995) 
Grafman (1989, 1995) argues that impairments following frontal damage may be attributed to deficits in task 
knowledge. In order to make this argument, Grafman presents a theory of the structure and organisation of that 
knowledge. Specifically, he proposes that the sequence of component tasks within a higher-level task, and their 
approximate durations, are represented in units (which he refers to as Managerial Knowledge Units: MKUs), that 
behaviour is controlled by MKUs, that MKUs are stored in the prefrontal cortex, and that frontal damage 
therefore impacts upon the use of MKUs to control behaviour. 
Managerial Knowledge Units are held to vary along (at least) two orthogonal dimensions. First, they may 
correspond either to high-level tasks carried out over an extended period or to low-level tasks carried out in a 
brief time period (or to any level in between). In this sense, MKUs range from high-level script-like or MOP-like 
entities (cf. Schank & Abelson, 1977; Schank, 1982) to low-level schema-like entities. Second, MKUs may vary 
 12
in specificity. A specific MKU relates to a particular event or class of highly similar events (e.g., a weekday 
morning routine). An abstract MKU is a generalisation over a number of loosely related more specific MKUs 
(e.g., an abstract morning routine that generalises over weekday, weekend, and holiday morning routines). When 
behaviour can be appropriately controlled by a concrete MKU (i.e., in situations for which behavioural routines 
have been developed, such as a typical weekday morning), it is. When a situation arises for which a concrete 
MKU is not available (e.g., the first morning of one’s retirement), behavioural control falls back upon 
appropriate but more abstract MKUs. 
The hierarchical organisation of MKUs is similar to the organisation of schemas within Norman & Shallice’s 
(1986) CS system, but (at least in recent versions of the theory: Grafman, 1995) that organisation is proposed to 
extend to high-level tasks. MKUs are also held to include entry and exit conditions (i.e., conditions under which 
they are normally performed, and their normal consequences). These are similar to schema pre-conditions and 
post-conditions in the CS model described above, but MKUs extend the concept of a schema by including 
temporal information concerning the approximate or normal duration of component MKUs, and information 
concerning the relative importance of component MKUs. This information is held to be critical in accounting for 
the control of behaviour in normals.  
It is assumed that frontal damage results in damage to the representation or retrieval of MKUs, but that more 
concrete MKUs (corresponding to more routine situations) are less prone to damage. These assumptions are held 
to account for the sensitivity of behaviour following frontal damage to task familiarity, with behaviour on 
familiar or routine tasks being less impaired than behaviour on less familiar or non-routine tasks. Sirigu and 
colleagues have found some evidence for this position. In a script generation study comparing patients with 
prefrontal lesions, patients with posterior lesions and controls, Sirigu et al. (1995) found that frontal patients 
made fewer errors in generating routine scripts (e.g., getting ready for work) than non-routine scripts (e.g., taking 
a holiday to Mexico). All subjects produced scripts that independent judges rated as containing sequence errors, 
but only subjects with frontal lesions produced scripts with closure errors (i.e., scripts that terminated before or 
after the stated goal). Frontal patients were also impaired on determining the importance of components within 
the scripts that they had generated (e.g., rating taking a shower more important than leaving home when going to 
work). (Curiously Zalla et al. (2000) report similar findings concerning the rating of importance by Parkinson’s 
Disease patients, though such patients have no difficulties in script generation, suggesting a dissociation between 
membership of a script and importance.) In a follow-up study Sirigu et al. (1996) examined the abilities of the 
same subjects to assemble scripts from cards describing potential script subcomponents. Frontal patients also 
performed poorly in this task, producing significantly more sequence errors and placing significantly more 
component activities in incorrect scripts. 
Although Grafman (1989, 1995) does not specifically address FA, his account of the functional consequences of 
frontal injury suggests that FA is the result of an impairment of task knowledge. This in itself is not a radical 
suggestion. Grafman’s contribution is more in specifying, through the concept of an MKU, what task knowledge 
might consist of, and arguing that a dual-systems account is not necessary to account for the behavioural 
disturbances of frontal patients. The account does not address specific error types (e.g., why omission errors are 
so common), or apraxias resulting from temporo-parietal damage. 
Rothi, Ochipa & Heilman (1991) 
A different level of analysis is reflected in the model of limb praxis proposed by Rothi et al. (1991). This model 
elaborates the stages of processing between various input modalities (specifically verbal, gestural and visual 
input) and motor output, based primarily on evidence from different forms of ideomotor apraxia and 
neurophysiology. It is proposed that motor control may make use of several functional subsystems, including 
action input and output lexicons (which contain representations of basic motor units for reception and production 
respectively) and an action semantics system (which contains knowledge of the purpose of actions, their 
organisation into sequences, and their relation to tools and objects). It is further proposed that motor output is 
mediated by innervatory patterns, that encode the muscle movements necessary for performing a particular 
action, and control movement via the motor cortex. With these subsystems in place, Rothi et al. (1991) argue 
that there are two processing routes between gestural input and motor output, namely a direct route via 
innervatory patterns, and an indirect route passing through the action input and output lexicons to innervatory 
patterns. This indirect route may also involve the action semantics system, which, in the case of visual object 
input, may also be activated by an object recognition system. 
Although the model is primarily concerned with ideomotor apraxia, Rothi et al. suggest that ideational apraxia 
may result from selective damage to the action semantics system. Such damage would not affect object 
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recognition, but would impact upon, for example, tool use. Notwithstanding this, the model is insufficiently 
specified to provide a detailed account of most error types under consideration (omissions, perseverations, etc.). 
As noted by Rumiati et al. (in press), it is also unclear how the model might account for object substitution 
errors. 
Kimberg & Farah (1993) 
A number of psychological impairments (beyond FA) are associated with frontal lobe damage. Kimberg & Farah 
(1993) cite four tasks that are typically performed poorly by frontal patients (motor sequencing, the Stroop task, 
Wisconsin card sorting, and memory for context), and provide a unified account of patient performance on these 
tasks in terms of a working memory impairment. The account is rooted in Goldman-Rakic’s (1992) account of 
frontal lobe function (in which dorsolateral prefrontal cortex instantiates a form of working memory) and 
supported by simulations developed within the ACT-R cognitive architecture (Anderson, 1993; Anderson & 
Lebiere, 1998). Of particular interest in the current context is motor sequencing, for Kimberg & Farah relate this 
task directly to impairments on behaviour in everyday activities (and hence to FA). The motor sequencing task 
involves five stimuli, each with an associated response. A response is required after the presentation of each 
stimulus. Following this another stimulus is presented. Frontal patients are able to perform the task, but make 
frequent errors. Most errors are perseverative in nature, and consist of producing a correct response on one trial 
and then producing the same, now incorrect, response on the following trial. 
ACT-R is a production system architecture in which working memory consists of a set of elements, each with its 
own activation value. Working memory elements are linked, such that they may activate each other. Activation 
is also subject to noise. The associations between stimuli and responses within the motor sequencing task are 
encoded as productions, which receive activation from working memory elements. Each stimulus excites 
elements in working memory, which then excite productions. The production that is most highly activated is the 
one which fires, generating a response. 
The ACT-R simulation of motor sequencing is able to perform the task without error (like normals). When 
working memory is impaired, however, through a weakening in the connections between working memory 
elements, the model produces frequent errors. The error pattern is qualitatively similar to that of frontal patients, 
with most errors being of the perseverative type, but with non-perseverative errors also occurring. This is only 
weakly supportive of FA as a working memory impairment, as the type of responses possible within the task are 
limited (incorrect responses are necessarily either perseverative or non-perseverative), and the task abstracts 
most of the complexities of everyday activities. Thus, there is nothing equivalent to simultaneously selecting 
actions and appropriate objects, or of maintaining a high-level goal such as preparing coffee. Furthermore 
responses are directly triggered by the presentation of a stimulus, so the likelihood of omission errors is small. 
Notwithstanding the simplicity of Kimberg & Farah’s motor task, it is clear that some errors produced by FA 
patients might be understood in terms of impaired working memory. Omission errors, for instance, may arise 
through forgetting of necessary steps (or weakening of links between steps), and certain perseverative errors may 
arise through forgetting that a specific goal has been achieved (or weakening of the link between a goal and the 
representation of its result). Object substitution errors may also, with some ingenuity, be attributed to a working 
memory impairment. If working memory contains object representations and those representations are linked to 
action control units, then a reduction in the strength of those links may result in an inappropriate object 
representation being activated even when the correct action control unit is activated. (Such an account goes well 
beyond the published Kimberg & Farah model, and owes much to the approach of Cooper & Shallice (2000).)  
While the preceding working memory account of different types of action error is feasible, it is unclear whether a 
unified account of frontal impairments is appropriate. As Kimberg & Farah note, there are dissociations among 
frontal tasks, with some patients performing well on some tasks and poorly on others, and vice versa. The effects 
of frontal damage cannot therefore be understood in terms of a general working memory impairment, as this fails 
to account for the diversity of observed deficits. If a working memory account of frontal behaviour is to be 
given, this diversity requires, at minimum, that patients with different behavioural deficits have different 
working memory impairments. One could speculate that such differences might arise from weakening of 
different types of links, but such speculation goes beyond the model of Kimberg & Farah, and undermines the 
claim that frontal impairments result from a general working memory deficit. 
There are several substantive differences between the working memory impairment account of FA and one based 
on a loosening of control between SAS and CS. First, Kimberg & Farah’s account is based on the use of a 
general purpose cognitive system (working memory), rather than a special purpose action control system (CS). 
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One consequence of this is that the working memory impairment account predicts interference between tasks 
requiring a memory load and non-routine action (cf. Schwartz, et al., 1998; Humphreys et al., 2000). Second, 
Kimberg & Farah (1993) argue that the dual systems approach of CS and SAS is unnecessary, and that isolated 
damage to supervisory processes cannot account for the behaviour of frontal patients on simple motor 
sequencing tasks or for the failure of such patients on memory for context tasks. However, the sufficiency of a 
single-system approach is not demonstrated by Kimberg & Farah. Critically they fail to show that tasks on which 
frontal patients perform well (e.g., standard tests of IQ) are not affected by working memory impairments. In 
addition the claim that motor sequencing does not require supervisory attention is open to debate: motor 
sequencing tasks may require the creation (by SAS) of a temporary schema to guide behaviour. 
Schwartz, Buxbaum et al. (1998, 1999) 
Perhaps the most extensive behavioural studies of disorders of everyday action following brain damage have 
been conducted by Schwartz, Buxbaum and colleagues (Schwartz, et al. 1991, 1995, 1998, 1999; Buxbaum et 
al., 1997, 1998). Recent studies (see especially Buxbaum et al., 1998) have shown strong behavioural 
similarities between IA and FA, as well as an apparent continuum of severity. Schwartz et al. (1998) argue that 
these results, and in particular effects of task complexity and the absence/presence of distractor objects (as 
described above), cannot be accounted for within either a working memory deficit account of action selection 
(such as that of Kimberg & Farah, 1993) or a supervisory failure account of action selection (such as that 
proposed by Shallice, 1988). Schwartz, Buxbaum and colleagues propose instead that the organisation of action 
requires some kind of cognitive resource, and that disorganisation of action as seen in FA is a consequence of 
diminished availability of this resource in impaired individuals. 
Evaluation of this proposal requires an elaboration of the notion of cognitive resource, together with a theory of 
how cognitive resources might be consumed by the processes of action organisation. Cooper et al. (submitted) 
have simulated key aspects of the data on which the resource theory is founded, and these simulations may be 
used to clarify the above issues. The simulations are based on the application of an extension of the Cooper & 
Shallice (2000) model of contention scheduling to the task of packing a lunchbox: one of the tasks used by 
Schwartz et al. to examine the organisation and breakdown of action control in normals and several patient 
groups. As noted above, the crucial extensions to the model involve the representation within the schema 
hierarchy of schema pre-conditions and post-conditions, which were used to regulate the excitation of 
component schemas by selected high-level schemas. Also as noted above, the model arguably blurs the 
distinction between CS and SAS by including such mechanisms. Nevertheless the extended model is able to 
account for normal behaviour on the task, and, via the addition of noise, for 1) the pattern of errors produced by 
neurological patients (with omission errors being most frequent, and substitution and sequence errors also 
occurring but at lesser rates) and 2) the sensitivity of such patients to distractor objects (leading to more omission 
and substitution errors). 
Schwartz et al. (1998) suggest that the effect of a reduction in availability of cognitive resources may be reduced 
availability of excitation within a hierarchically structured activation-based schema network. Cooper et al. 
(submitted) further suggest that one effect of this reduction in excitation is to magnify the effects of noise 
inherent in the system. Hence the reduction in excitation may be modelled as an increase in noise. The blurring 
of the distinction between CS and SAS inherent in the approach is also consistent with the single-systems 
position advocated by Schwartz et al. (1991). 
Humphreys & Forde (1998) 
Case studies of the control of everyday action have also been reported by Humphreys & Forde (1998), who find 
support for the distinction between CS and SAS and the internal composition of CS in terms of a hierarchically 
structured activation-based schema control system. Humphreys & Forde note, however, a double dissociation 
between two forms of perseverative disorganisation exhibited by their frontal apraxic patients. Both patients 
produced perseverative errors on everyday tasks (such as cutting wrapping paper while wrapping a present), but 
in one case these perseverative errors were of the continuous type (involving immediate repetition of an action) 
and in the other they were of the recurrent type (involving returning to a previous action after an interval). Both 
types of perseveration have previously been observed in the disorganised behaviour of frontal patients (cf. 
Schwartz et al., 1991), but the double dissociation suggests either that in normal behaviour different mechanisms 
are responsible for preventing the different forms of perseveration, or that a single mechanism is involved but 
that that mechanism can break down in different ways. 
In order to account for the different forms of perseverative error Humphreys and Forde (1998) propose that the 
sequencing of components within a schema is controlled by a process of competitive queuing (cf. Houghton, 
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1990; Burgess & Hitch, 1992; Shallice et al., 1995; Glasspool, 1998). Nodes within the competitive queuing 
mechanism receive activation from control units which varies with time. The strength of this activation on any 
node depends on the desired position of that node within the sequence. Nodes earlier in the sequence initially 
receive greater excitation from the control nodes, but once a node is selected (and its corresponding action 
performed) it is inhibited. In addition, as steps in the sequence are performed the activation gradient from the 
control nodes changes to bias nodes later in the sequence (see figure 4). In normal functioning this inhibition 
prevents a node from being reselected and allows subsequent nodes to become active. Humphreys & Forde 
(1998) suggest that continuous perseveration may result from a failure of the inhibitory process, whereas 
recurrent perseveration may result from faulty operation of the control signal. 
 
Figure 4: A competitive queuing architecture for action control. 
Control nodes are those labelled “Start” and “End”. 
Connections marked  are mutually inhibitory. 
Adapted from Humphreys et al. (2000). 
The introduction of sequence control nodes differentiates the proposal from the Cooper & Shallice (2000) model 
and leads to a system with some similarity to that of MacKay (1985). The competitive queuing approach also has 
much to commend it with regard to the learning of action sequences (a clear deficiency in the Cooper & Shallice 
model). However, it is unclear that different forms of failure are required to generate different types of 
perseveration within a competitive queuing approach. In particular, the dynamics of competitive queuing require 
that schema nodes are strongly inhibited upon deselection. If this inhibition is slightly too weak, a schema node 
may gradually recover and eventually be inappropriately reselected. This corresponds to the case of recurrent 
perseveration. If inhibition is very weak, it may be insufficient to prevent a schema node from being immediately 
(and inappropriately) reselected. This corresponds to the case of continuous perseveration. Thus, different forms 
of perseveration may arise from a single mechanism with different levels of impairment. This suggests a slightly 
different account of recurrent perseveration than that given by Humphreys & Forde (1998), but does not 
undermine the basic competitive queuing approach. 
It is also relevant to note that the double dissociation between types of perseveration is consistent with the 
Cooper & Shallice model. Within that model, continuous perseveration will arise if inhibition following 
completion of a schema is insufficient. Recurrent perseveration requires a different mechanism: decay of 
information concerning goal achievement. 
Humphreys, Forde & Francis (2000) 
While Humphreys & Forde (1998) accept a division between routine and non-routine action control systems, 
they question the division in later work (Humphreys et al., 2000), where they report an experiment in which 
errorful performance was induced in the everyday actions of normal controls by loading working memory with a 
secondary task (the “Trails Test”, in which participants are given a letter/number pair, e.g., E3, and required to 
continue the sequence with successive pairs, e.g., F4, G5, etc.). Errors on the Trails Test were generally self-
corrected, but most errors on the everyday tasks arose immediately after an error on the Trails Test. Humphreys 
et al. (2000) interpret the results in terms of working memory failure (in a way analogous to Kimberg & Farah, 
1993), and suggest that the role of working memory in everyday action is in maintaining goal representations, 
and that the role of goal representations is to provide an appropriate activation gradient across action nodes 
within a competitive queuing system.  
Botvinick & Plaut (2000) 
A common feature of most of the above accounts of action control is the assumption of a hierarchically 
structured representation of action schemas. In addition, many of the accounts (MacKay, 1985; Humphreys & 
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Forde, 1998, Cooper & Shallice, 2000) assume an underlying system of interactive activation, in which nodes 
corresponding to action schemas have activation values that are affected by various influences, and selection of 
an action schema is determined by the schema’s activation value. Botvinick & Plaut (2000) reject both of these 
assumptions, and present instead a recurrent network model (cf. Elman, 1990) in which action is triggered by a 
distributed (non-hierarchically structured) internal representation of task context, with that context being a 
function of the current state of the environment and the context at the previous stage of processing. Action units 
in the model correspond to basic level actions (e.g., pick up, pour, put down), as in the model of contention 
scheduling described above, but there are no nodes corresponding to higher-lever action schemas, and there is no 
competition between action nodes. The only input to action nodes comes from the representation of task context 
(see figure 5). 
 
Figure 5: A recurrent network architecture for sequential action control. 
Adapted from Botvinick & Plaut (2000). 
Task knowledge within the model is embodied in connection weights between the input environment 
representation, the context representation, and the action nodes. One implication of the embodiment of task 
knowledge in this way is that knowledge of the components of a sequence and knowledge of their position in 
that sequence cannot be dissociated. Hence the model predicts, in apparent conflict with the results of Sirigu et 
al. (1995, 1996), that order and content of sequential behaviour cannot be independently impaired. 
As in most recurrent network models, task knowledge is acquired through supervised learning. That is, the model 
is presented with a series of input/output pairs (both in isolation and in sequence), and weights are modified 
according to now well-established procedures such that the model’s output for any combination of input and 
context comes to more closely resemble the required output. Botvinick & Plaut (2000) demonstrate that, after 
training, the model is able to successfully perform everyday tasks such as preparing tea and coffee. Within the 
model these tasks involve completing 35 to 40 actions in sequence and with appropriate objects. The basic 
approach is considerably simpler than each of the approaches sketched above, and, although it is unclear how the 
model might account for behaviours suggestive of an activation-based substrate (e.g., Parkinson’s disease and 
amphetamine psychosis — see also Lashley, 1951), it nevertheless demonstrates that many of the complexities in 
more traditional approaches (e.g., hierarchical structuring, goal-dependent excitation and inhibition after 
completing a schema) may not be necessary for an account of routine action selection. In addition, the inclusion 
of a learning mechanism addresses a clear deficiency of the Cooper & Shallice (2000) model. (Though see 
Cooper & Glasspool (2001) for preliminary results on the learning of schema triggering conditions.) 
Action slips and lapses and frontal apraxia may both be simulated in the Botvinick & Plaut model by adding 
noise to the representation of context. Small amounts of noise lead to occasional errors similar to those 
catalogued by Norman (1981) and Reason (1979, 1984). When noise is greater, errors are more extreme, and 
may include instances of all types observed in frontal apraxic patients. Perhaps surprisingly the model can 
produce object substitution errors (even though it has no separate representation of objects) and both continuous 
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and recurrent forms of perseveration. It is unclear, however, if recurrent and continuous perseveration may 
dissociate within the model in the way observed by Humphreys & Forde (1998). 
Botvinick & Plaut (2000) do not discuss the application of their model to the simulation of ideational apraxia. 
One may nevertheless speculate on how other forms of damage may affect the model’s behaviour. In particular, 
errors of tool use are likely to result from the addition of noise to the input representation of the environment, but 
it is unclear how (or even if) such damage might impact upon sequential behaviour. Further simulations are 
necessary.  
Several other issues remain to be addressed by Botvinick & Plaut. Of particular importance is the intended 
relation between the model and supervisory processes, which is unclear. Action within the model is initiated by 
the input of a representation corresponding to a task instruction, such as whether tea or coffee should be 
prepared. Such instructions are equivalent to high-level schemas in hierarchical models. It is unclear if Botvinick 
& Plaut subscribe to a dual-systems approach, but it is not incompatible with the model to assume that 
supervisory processes may generate representations of task instructions and use them to trigger the system into 
performing the corresponding action sequence. It is even compatible to assume that representations 
corresponding to action sequences of different levels of complexity (e.g., preparing coffee as well as its subtasks) 
may be generated by a supervisory system, and that a single, well-trained, model may be able to respond 
appropriately to both high-level and lower-level task instructions. Such extensions would appear to be necessary 
if the model is to be applied with different levels of supervisory control, or if it is to be re-configured part-way 
through a task to correct an error. 
General Discussion: Emergent Issues 
The above theories differ in a variety of ways. The principal differences point to four key issues concerning the 
control of everyday action and its breakdown following neurological damage. 
Action Control: One System or Two? 
Debates have arisen in several areas of cognitive psychology concerning the existence or otherwise of multiple 
systems (e.g., reading: Seidenberg & McClelland (1989) versus Coltheart et al. (1993); inflectional morphology: 
MacWhiney & Leinbach (19891) versus Marcus et al. (1995); object semantics: Shallice (1987) versus Riddoch 
et al., 1988). Arguably, action control should be added to this list. While the CS/SAS theory is accepted by 
many, the distinction between two qualitatively distinct forms of action control has been questioned by Grafman 
(1995) and Schwartz, Buxbaum and colleagues (Schwartz, et al. 1998, 1999; Buxbaum et al., 1998; Giovannetti 
et al., submitted). Separable systems are also not implicated in Kimberg & Farah’s (1993) working memory 
deficit view of frontal apraxia, and Humphreys et al. (2000) suggest that the errors of control subjects in their 
dual-task paradigm are best accounted for by a failure to maintain goal state information within a single system, 
rather than by a dual-systems view. Parsimony also favours a single-system approach. 
However, Humphreys et al. (2000) do provide an alternative account of their data in which the everyday task is 
controlled by a separate system that is prone to error, but that is monitored by another (presumably executive) 
process. This is entirely consistent with the dual-system view, and with the fractionation of supervisory 
processes proposed by Shallice & Burgess (1996). Two criticisms of this alternative account — concerning the 
error-prone nature of the routine system and the need for the error monitor to have its own model of correct task 
performance — are easily met by recalling that everyday tasks are not necessarily routine tasks, and by noting 
that if supervisory processes are able to control basic-level action when necessary, then those processes must 
have access to a model of correct task performance. The dual-systems view also receives independent support 
from engineering approaches to the construction of autonomous agents, which have found separate systems for 
the control of routine behaviours and for the construction and subsequent execution of plans in non-routine 
situations to be highly desirable, if not necessary (Shallice, 1988; see also Glasspool, 2000). 
There is also some debate about the cognitive reality of schemas (or similar task knowledge structures) and their 
hierarchical structuring. Explicit hierarchical structuring is apparent in the approaches of Norman & Shallice 
(1980, 1986), Roy & Square (1985), MacKay (1985) and Grafman (1989, 1995), but hierarchical structuring is 
absent from the proposal of Humphreys et al. (2000), and in the recurrent network model of Botvinick & Plaut 
(2000) schemas play no causal role — they are merely emergent regularities over trajectories in a multi-
dimensional activation space. 
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Frontal Apraxia and Ideational Apraxia: One Disorder or Two? 
Frontal Apraxia and Ideational Apraxia are traditionally viewed as distinct disorders that affect everyday action. 
They differ at least in the localisation of neural damage and in the other behavioural disturbances that tend to be 
associated with the disorders. On the CS/SAS approach to action control, the disorders are clearly distinct: 
Ideational Apraxia is a disorder of CS and Frontal Apraxia is a disorder of SAS affecting its control over CS. 
However, the results of group studies by Schwartz, Buxbaum and colleagues (especially Buxbaum et al., 1998) 
have raised the possibility that the distinction between the disorders is not well founded. The absence of any 
effect of patient type on error profile in their Multi-Level Action Task, together with the continuity of error 
profile across severity of deficit, has been taken by Schwartz, Buxbaum and colleagues as indicating that 
everyday action disorganisation in these patient groups is a consequence of a single underlying deficit. While it 
is possible that these results reflect group study methodology applied to patients with “impure” deficits, single 
case studies of IA and FA, showing double dissociations in, for example, error profiles on everyday tasks, 
remain to be reported. 
Sequential Control: Interactive Activation or Recurrent Activation? 
Most (well-specified) accounts of action control are based on an underlying activation-based system in which 
nodes corresponding to actions receive both triggering activation from a representation of the environment and 
context activation from some representation of the task. These sources of excitation combine to yield one active 
action representation, which is then performed. 
There are two basic variations on this theme: interactive activation, in which schema nodes are discrete entities 
that excite and inhibit each other, and recurrent activation, where schemas are not explicitly represented and 
where task context is represented in a distributed connectionist fashion. Of the approaches based on interactive 
activation, each is founded on a different computational mechanism for sequential control. Thus, Roy & Square 
(1985) suggest that sequence is controlled through a system of production rules, MacKay (1985) proposes 
separate sequence nodes in which order arises from inhibition of later nodes by earlier nodes, Humphreys & 
Forde (1998) suggest a system based on competitive queuing, and Cooper & Shallice (2000) suggest ordering 
constraints that gate top-down excitation of component schema nodes. 
Botvinick & Plaut’s (2000) recurrent activation model stands out against this backdrop of interactive activation 
approaches. The Botvinick & Plaut approach demonstrates that some action selection errors, previously thought 
to be characteristic of an underlying interactive activation mechanism, may arise from a recurrent system. 
However, several questions remain to be addressed by the approach. Most notably, the relation between the 
recurrent system and supervisory processes such as error correction remains unspecified. 
Breakdown of Action Control: A Disorder of Knowledge or Control? 
One issue implicit in the above survey of theories of action control and its breakdown concerns the relation 
between knowledge and the use of that knowledge in the control of action. The existence of object substitution 
errors would appear to suggest that breakdown of knowledge relating to object use or to object-action 
associations may be a contributing factor in FA, and some forms of action control breakdown may plausibly be 
attributed to loss of such knowledge (e.g., semantic dementia: Hodges, et al., 2000). Some consensus is 
emerging, however, that FA may be attributed not to loss of task knowledge but to failure to appropriately use 
task knowledge. Thus, Humphreys & Forde (1998) note one frontal apraxic prone to perseverative errors who, 
when cutting wrapping paper in order to wrap a present, stated that the paper was not big enough, but continued 
to cut the paper into smaller and smaller pieces. In this instance the patient’s deficit would appear to be in his 
control of action (and an inability to inhibit his ongoing activities) rather than in his knowledge. This view is 
further supported by the presentation by Forde & Humphreys (2000) of an FA patient who, despite no loss of 
object semantic knowledge, was still prone to object substitution errors. The ability of the frontal apraxics of 
Rumiati et al. (in press) to sequence pictures of activities that they could not perform correctly likewise suggests 
an impairment in performance and not competence. This is consistent with the results of Sirigu et al. (1995, 
1996), who found that frontal patients were able to generate descriptions of the components of on everyday task, 
but were impaired on sequencing those components, and echoed in the contention scheduling model (Cooper & 
Shallice, 2000), where action disorganisation results from an impairment to activation propagation within the 
hierarchical control mechanism rather than to schema knowledge, the cognitive resource theory of Schwartz, 
Buxbaum and colleagues (Schwartz et al., 1998; Buxbaum et al., 1998; Giovannetti et al., submitted), and the 
competitive queuing model proposed by Humphreys et al. (2000), in which action disorganisation is attributed to 
a failure to maintain appropriate excitation of goal structures in working memory (and the consequent loss of an 
appropriate activation gradient within a competitive queuing action sequencing system). 
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The one account of everyday action disorganisation that contrasts with this consensus is that of Botvinick & 
Plaut (2000). This model makes no clear distinction between knowledge and control. As such, breakdown of the 
model cannot unambiguously be attributed to a breakdown in either component. 
Conclusion 
Breakdown in the control of everyday action may arise following a variety of neurological disorders. While such 
breakdown has informed theories of the control of action, disagreement remains over the answers to fundamental 
questions. On the empirical side, recent work has shown that omission errors are common in the behaviour of 
both frontal apraxics and ideational apraxics, and that both patient groups are less susceptible to utilisation errors 
than had previously been thought. There is also converging evidence that, at least in the case of frontal apraxia, 
the disorder is a disorder of control and the use of knowledge, rather than a disorder of knowledge per se. 
However, the status of frontal apraxia and ideational apraxia as resulting from distinct functional disorders has 
been questioned. On the theoretical side, the issue has arisen of whether separable systems exist for the control 
of routine and non-routine activities, and, if so, what role the non-routine action control system plays in the 
control of everyday (as opposed to routine) activities. On the computational side, there is substantial debate over 
the control mechanisms underlying sequential behaviour. Recent implementation work has resulted in a better 
understanding of some candidate mechanisms, but has not helped to discriminate between them. In part, this may 
be attributed to difficulties in simulating action over extended periods, when that action may be modulated by 
high-level, willed, cognitive processes. Addressing these difficulties should lead to significant progress in our 
understanding of the control of everyday action. 
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